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Quality assurance exercises and networking on the detection of highly infectious pathogens
(QUANDHIP) is a joint action initiative set up in 2011 that has successfully unified the pri-
mary objectives of the European Network on Highly Pathogenic Bacteria (ENHPB) and of
P4-laboratories (ENP4-Lab) both of which aimed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness,
and response capabilities of laboratories directed at protecting the health of European cit-
izens against high consequence bacteria and viruses of significant public health concern.
Both networks have established a common collaborative consortium of 37 nationally and
internationally recognized institutions with laboratory facilities from 22 European coun-
tries. The specific objectives and achievements include the initiation and establishment
of a recognized and acceptable quality assurance scheme, including practical external
quality assurance exercises, comprising living agents, that aims to improve laboratory per-
formance, accuracy, and detection capabilities in support of patient management and public
health responses; recognized training schemes for diagnostics and handling of highly patho-
genic agents; international repositories comprising highly pathogenic bacteria and viruses
for the development of standardized reference material; a standardized and transparent
Biosafety and Biosecurity strategy protecting healthcare personnel and the community
in dealing with high consequence pathogens; the design and organization of response
capabilities dealing with cross-border events with highly infectious pathogens including
the consideration of diagnostic capabilities of individual European laboratories.The project
tackled several sensitive issues regarding Biosafety, Biosecurity and “dual use” concerns.
The article will give an overview of the project outcomes and discuss the assessment of
potential “dual use” issues.
Keywords: EQAE in diagnostic, anthrax, tularemia, plague, melioidosis, glanders, brucellosis, dual use research of
concern
INTRODUCTION
Internationally accepted biological infectious agents are divided
into four risk groups based on their virulence, potential of public
health threat, and availability of adequate treatment. Risk group
1 poses the lowest and risk group 4 the highest level of threat.
A complex risk assessment for handling these pathogens leads to
the definition of corresponding biosafety levels 1–4 (BSL1–4 or P
1–4) including technical, organizational, and personal protective
measures. Highly pathogenic bacteria of risk group 3, e.g. Bacillus
anthracis, Yersinia pestis, or Francisella tularensis, and risk group 4
viruses, e.g. haemorrhagic fever viruses, could cause severe diseases
in humans and animals and are suspected to be used in bioter-
rorism attacks (1–7). Although there are various endemic areas
in Europe for some of these zoonotic agents causing outbreaks,
many questions about the epidemiology and ecology of these bac-
teria still remain open. In the context with other highly frequent
diseases, the impact of infections caused by these bacteria and
viruses on public health in Europe was so far rather limited. This
also seems to be one of the reasons why the commercialization
of diagnostic tests for these agents has not raised large interest
and the microbiological laboratories are mostly forced to rely on
their in-house assays. However, reliable diagnostics should be at
hand for eventual natural outbreaks, for unpredictable imported
cases and for the deliberate release of these agents, which poses an
ongoing threat to the human population. Because of the different
impacts and unpredictabilities of these agents to human health
in different countries, networking of interested and/or appointed
laboratories providing diagnostics in this field should be a logical
consequence to exchange experiences, knowledge, and material
supporting the laboratory response to outbreaks of these agents in
single countries or cross-border events.
Diagnostic laboratories need to participate in quality assur-
ance exercises to assess their diagnostic approaches and to define
measures for improvement and maintenance of their diagnostic
capacities and capabilities. One of the reasons for the establish-
ment of the EU Joint Action (JA) Quality Assurance Exercises
and Networking on the Detection of Highly Infectious Pathogens
(QUANDHIP) was the fact that capacities and possibilities to
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conduct proficiency tests in this field are very limited in many
European countries (8). The JA is running from August 2011
to July 2014 and aims to link and consolidate the objectives
of two existing networks dealing with highly infectious bacte-
ria and viruses: The bacterial network emerged from the EU
funded project EQADeBa (EAHC n°2007 204), coordinated by the
Robert Koch-Institut (RKI), Germany, and served as a basis for the
European Network on Highly Pathogenic Bacteria (ENHPB). The
other one is the European Network of P4-laboratories (ENP4-
Lab) project (EAHC n°2006 208), coordinated by L. Spallanzani
National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI), Italy. The pri-
mary objective of the JA is to stabilize both network activities,
which link 37 highly specialized and advanced partner laboratories
from 22 European countries (Figure 1).
The overall goal of the project was the improvement of the
detection and diagnosis of highly pathogenic bacterial and viral
agents as well as to provide and further develop the laboratory
support to the EU in the management of biological cross-border
events. The range of target agents to be diagnosed is given in
Table 1.
The JA developed a supportive European infrastructure and
strategy for external quality assurance exercises (EQAEs) in order
to establish a universal exchange of best diagnostic strategies.
The EQAEs included shipment of infectious reference mater-
ial, bacterial antibiotic susceptibility testing, the development of
international repositories of reference material, shipment of living
Table 1 | Diagnostic target agents in QUANDHIP.
Bacteria Viruses
Bacillus anthracis Filoviruses (Ebola hemorrhagic fever)
Francisella tularensis ssp.
the subspecies level
Arenaviruses (Lassa hemorrhagic fever)
Yersinia pestis Bunyaviruses (Crim Congo hemorrhagic fever)
Burkholderia mallei Orthopoxviruses
Burkholderia pseudomallei Paramyxoviruses like Nipah and Hendra viruses
Brucella sp. New viruses
Coxiella burnetii
Hamburg 
Warsaw 
Milin 
Vienna 
Budapest 
Lyon 
Madrid 
Lisbon 
Porton Down 
Stockholm 
Copenhagen 
Brussels 
2 x Rome 
Helsinki 
Tallinn 
Riga 
Vilnius 
Sofia 
Athens 
2 x Oslo 
Spiez 
Bilthoven 
Bilbao 
Vert-le-Petit 
Brescia 
Puławy 
Foggia 
Berlin 
Marburg 
Munich 
Jena 
FIGURE 1 | Participating laboratories in QUANDHIP.
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bacterial cultures, training, and Biosafety and Biosecurity review-
ing of current practices. A special work package (WP) was directed
to describe the capacities and capabilities of European laborato-
ries, which are responsible for the analysis of highly pathogenic
infectious agents and to provide recommendations on the acti-
vation mechanisms and the support offered by the QUANDHIP
partners and the network in case of biological cross-border events.
Most of these activities and the related data required an assess-
ment of bio-risks in terms of Biosafety and Biosecurity including
dual-use research of concern (DURC), which will be discussed
in this article together with the most important outcomes of the
project.
The general discussion on DURC was renewed when two stud-
ies on transmissibility of the avian influenza virus H5N1 got pub-
lished (9). The dual-use problem concerning research is described
on the coordinator’s (RKI) website as follows:“Research and devel-
opment in the life sciences have crucially contributed to today’s
progress and improvement of living conditions. At the same time,
findings in the life sciences often run the risk of being misused to
the detriment of society and environment. This “double applica-
bility” of scientific findings is described as the “dual use dilemma.”
The potential for misuse of scientific findings is especially obvious
for research on pathogenic microorganisms and toxins: on the one
hand, research results regarding transmissibility, pathogenesis, and
genomics of pathogenic biological agents are indispensable to pre-
vent the agents’ spread and proliferation and to enable or improve
the treatment of infection and exposure to toxins. On the other
hand, these results can also potentially be misused to cause harm
to humans, animals, or plants (9, 10). It should be considered that
not only biological agents as tools of research but also information
on the outcomes of research activities could be categorized as dual-
use dilemma. Appropriate Biosafety and Biosecurity measures and
conventions can contribute to prevent the harmful side of biolog-
ical research. Our project contains three horizontal (coordination,
dissemination, evaluation) and five core (EQAE, repository, train-
ing, Biosafety and Biosecurity, support in cross-border biological
events) WPs, which will be illustrated and discussed in terms of
Biosafety/Biosecurity and DURC issues.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
WP 1–3 PROJECT COORDINATION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION
Before submitting the application for the JA, all potential partners
were selected by an official “Letter of Intent” stating and con-
firming that these public or governmental institutes have been
assigned the task to perform diagnostics on highly pathogenic
agents under appropriate Biosafety and Biosecurity conditions.
This was approved by the project controlling “Consumers, Health
and Food Executive Agency” (CHAFEA). The JA was managed
by the coordinator RKI and the co-coordinator INMI. A Steering
Committee (SC), consisting of selected partners, had the func-
tion, in addition to the coordinators, to check the correct and
timely implementation of the work program. An external Sci-
entific Advisory Board (SAB), comprising representatives of the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),
the World Health Organization (WHO), and the European Com-
mission, was set up for the evaluation of the project activities and
gave advice for the optimization of contents and the course of
the project in general. Both coordinators kept close contact so
that all decisions were agreed between the coordinators before-
hand, and, where necessary, including the SC, SAB, and individual
partners. The JA comprised common and separate actions for the
bacterial and viral network, the Network on Highly Infectious Bac-
teria (abbreviated here as NIB), coordinated by the RKI, and the
Network on Highly Infectious Viruses/P4-Laboratories (abbrevi-
ated here as NIV), coordinated by INMI. Altogether, three joint
meetings of both bacterial and viral networks, combined with an
SAB meeting, and three separate meetings of each of the networks
were organized. The meetings were used to share scientific and
administrative information. The coordinators are running a pub-
lic website and an internal workspace on a secure official server
to share sensitive information. The project was presented on sev-
eral scientific conferences/meetings, and a number of publications
were developed. Besides the continuous internal controlling, the
external evaluation of the project was performed by the CHAFEA,
also including an external review of the interim report, and by
the SAB.
WP 4 EXTERNAL QUALITY ASSURANCE EXERCISES
Administrative preparation
The providers of EQAEs, RKI and PUM, prepared the samples and
took care of quality assurance and shipment. The partners carried
out the analysis of the samples due to the given parameters. The
shipment of samples was realized by the selected shipping agency
fulfilling all regulations for transportation of dangerous goods
and national import/export regulations (10–16). The EQAEs were
conducted separately for the highly pathogenic bacteria, includ-
ing living and inactivated bacterial samples of risk group 3, and
for the risk group 4 viruses, only including non-infectious nucleic
acid from risk group 4 viruses so far. According to the Consortium
Agreement a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) was signed for
each EQAE by provider and recipient.
Beforehand, all partners were asked to provide and confirm
officially that they are entitled to handle risk group 3 and/or 4
agents, respectively, and carry out the work under appropriate
Biosafety and Biosecurity conditions using a questionnaire devel-
oped in the framework of the previous projects EQADeBa and
ENP4 and further optimized during this JA (WP 7). Partners who
are not yet or currently not able to handle risk group 3 bacteria
agreed to receive only sets of inactivated samples. The prepared
living and inactivated samples were suitable for the application of
different methods like molecular genetic methods, immunologi-
cal methods, biochemical methods, or microbiological methods.
In case of risk group 4 viruses, nucleic acid samples were only
delivered to participants who practically have the possibility to
further analyze positive samples under BSL4 conditions, having
direct access to those laboratories, or having established collabo-
rations and agreements with such laboratories. The sample design,
preparation, and quality control of the EQAEs are described under
the Supplementary material.
The data analysis was performed by the providers of the EQAEs
and recommendations given for further improvement. QuoData
was chosen as subcontractor and developed a new software for
data entry and analyses, which has been used for the evaluation of
the second and third NIB-EQAE (17).
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For EQAEs on viruses, the procedure for the preparation of
samples sent for these exercises was (1) amplification of the virus
in cell culture; (2) inactivation by gamma irradiation (implying
fragmentation of viral nucleic acid); (3) verification of inactivation
procedure, no addition of PCR inhibitors; (4) testing of stability
of the sample; (5) serial dilution and testing via (RT)-PCR and
q(RT)-PCR. In some cases, human sera, spiked with the virus and
inactivated as above, were used as testing material.
WP 5 REPOSITORY
To establish an international bacterial RG3 repository, a number of
strains were provided by the participants to the RKI, who has been
setting up and is keeping this repository. All strains were confirmed
for their identity and phenotypic and molecular characteristics.
DNA and inactivated bacteria were developed as reference mater-
ial. According to the procedure for usage of the repository, which
has been agreed by all participants beforehand, a limited set of
material was delivered to partners on request. The repository was
also used for the development of EQAE samples.
The BSL4-laboratories developed a list of key reference viral
strains located at individual laboratories. The exchange of mate-
rial between partners was agreed and regulated. For security and
administrative reasons the exchange of “living”risk group 4 viruses
was reduced to a minimum.
WP 6 TRAINING
From the very first beginning of the project, several training
programs, usually running for one week, were designed by the
participating laboratories and listed and made accessible to all
partners by the coordinator first by e-mail, later via the internal
workspace. Partners could select and prioritize training programs
of up to 10 days they considered most beneficial. For security
and administrative reasons, usually only staff listed in the grant
agreement was allowed to attend the training.
For risk group 4 viruses, rather theoretical courses were orga-
nized, covering various aspects of BSL4 work (basic knowl-
edge, biosafety, management issues, competency, and scenario
exercises).
WP 7 BIOSAFETY, BIOSECURITY
The infrastructure checklists for Biosafety and Biosecurity com-
posed of the two existing networks (EQADeBa/ENHPB and ENP4)
dealing with highly dangerous bacteria and viruses, respectively,
have been compared, evaluated, reviewed, and exchanged.
In addition, the checklists and recommendations produced
by other already completed European programs [e.g. Biosafety-
Europe, European Training in Infectious Disease Emergencies –
ETIDE (18), European Research Infrastructure on Highly Patho-
genic Agents – ERINHA (19)] have been assimilated for review and
impact on the outputs of this WP. This work has been supported
by an external internationally recognized specialist for Biosafety
and Biosecurity.
WP 8 SUPPORT TO CROSS-BORDER EVENTS
In order to comply with the objectives, the Project Coordinators
created an expert working group, composed of both Coordinators,
supported by external expert consultants and by staff from Euro-
pean Health Authorities involved in the SAB of the project. The aim
was to develop an operational document containing recommenda-
tions on laboratory management of biological events and defining
the role and activation procedures for the QUANDHIP network
in case of international biological cross-border events. The tasks
were agreed with the representatives of the EC and worked out
with the support indicated above. Possibly occurring real events
will be used for the evaluation of the developed document.
RESULTS UNDER SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF SECURITY
ISSUES
MANAGING ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHARING OF SENSITIVE
INFORMATION (REGARDING WP 1-3)
The QUANDHIP JA activities require the sharing of sensitive
information between the consortium partners. This is made pos-
sible by strong joint project coordination (RKI and INMI) and a
culture of trust that has been built over many years through vari-
ous European networking projects in the area of high containment
laboratory work. In addition to a core coordination, the QUAND-
HIP partnership relies on the inputs from a SC, consisting of the
main activity leaders and an external SAB. To manage the collab-
orations within the consortium, collaborating partners, the SC,
and the SAB, a number of specific agreements have been devel-
oped and signed by all parties. These agreements were approved
by the legal departments of the coordinator and all participants.
The agreements, which were signed by all partners, contained
beyond administrative and financial issues several regulations
also preventing any misuse of material, data and information
like
- responsibilities of partners,
- guidelines for a reference material repository of highly patho-
genic bacteria,
- conditions for distribution of highly pathogenic viruses,
- training, including security instructions or security check of
personnel if required,
- non-disclosure of information,
- handling of data, dissemination, intellectual properties,
- Material transfer agreement (MTA) concerning the extension of
the ENHPB repository, concerning the distribution of material
from the ENHPB repository,
- model MTA for distribution of highly pathogenic viruses.
The network websites and electronic mail transfer have ensured
regular communication between participants (8). The internal
website was provided by a secure German official provider.
For external communication beyond the consortium, it was
important to establish a communication channel and coordi-
nation with other relevant European networks like the ECDC
funded project European Network for Diagnostics of “Imported”
Viral Diseases (ENIVD) (20) and the ERINHA to improve col-
laboration and exchange of relevant information and to avoid
duplication in any international activities. To achieve this, bilat-
eral meetings were arranged and letters of collaboration developed
in order to clarify how information would be exchanged in a
responsible manner. In addition, a dissemination plan was devel-
oped and all QUANDHIP JA deliverables were assessed in order
to determine their confidentiality level. Except for the detailed
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interim and final reports, which were restricted only to relevant
EU stakeholders (defined by CHAFEA), most of the deliverables
were supposed to be made available to the scientific community.
As a matter of course, the detailed results of the EQAEs provided
by the individual partners were treated confidentially by the eval-
uators of the EQAEs and were published only in an anonymized
form. The primary target groups to be considered in the dissem-
ination strategy were laboratory workers of the associated and
collaborating partners dealing with the diagnostics of high threat
pathogens, biosafety experts, first responders, clinical staff, and
security forces. In the framework of this project, various docu-
ments including recommendations for diagnostics, Biosafety and
Biosecurity, management of biological events, and risk assessment
from the laboratory perspective were or will be developed until
the end of the project. So far, 40 scientific presentations and
publications were used for dissemination of information on the
QUANDHIP JA.
The evaluation of the project was done by CHAFEA and reli-
able external specialists working together in the SAB who approved
by their signatures the confidentiality rules and procedures of the
Commission. Altogether, the internal and external management
of information sharing benefits from a trusted network of experts,
collaborating external partners, and transparency in terms of the
documentation of the “code of practice” when information is pro-
duced through the work of the QUANDHIP JA. Ultimately, the
management of dual-use risks associated with information shar-
ing on these high containment pathogens is ensured through a
strong project coordination team and close collaboration with the
funding authorities.
DUAL-USE ISSUES CONCERNED WITH “EXTERNAL QUALITY
ASSURANCE EXERCISES” (REGARDING WP 4)
External Quality Assurances are part of a methodology aimed
at assessing the quality of laboratory diagnostics and strategy at
the participating laboratories. EQAEs can be helpful to identify
‘best practices’ for certain diagnostic approaches which can be
exchanged between participants for improvement of own proce-
dures. It also can be a reflection of the overall quality management
systems of the laboratory. Within the QUANDHIP JA framework,
EQAE rounds involve the preparation and shipment of a panel of
coded samples (living or inactivated) to participating laboratories.
The laboratories test the samples and then return the results to the
central coordination place of the EQAE round. The coordination
processes the results and provides feedback to all participants so
that they can only identify their own proficiency scores but also in
a way that they can compare it with the performance of all other
participants in an anonymized way. This information enables the
laboratories, which did not perform so well or have certain defi-
ciencies, to perform internal checks of their diagnostic assays and
quality systems and make adaptations to improve their perfor-
mance in the next testing round. Also there is the opportunity
for exchange of information, protocols, and event training of the
partners to improve their proficiency. As this exercise involves the
shipment of materials with dual-use potential and the reporting of
sensitive information that could expose vulnerabilities in the capa-
bility to detect high containment pathogens, the QUANDHIP JA
has developed strategies to mitigate this risk.
The results and lessons the QUANDHIP coordination team
has learned from the experience of performing six EQAs (both
within the NIB and NIV sub-networks of the QUANDHIP JA) are
summarized here.
The first mitigation of risk was to ensure that the partners
involved in the performance of the EQAs had the bio-risk man-
agement elements in place to receive non-attenuated or live strains
of the pathogens belonging to the testing panel.
The agreed EQA objective was therefore to identify progress
and best practices in the performances of the participating labo-
ratories as well as to identify gaps to be filled. This rationale was
of clear public health benefit for preparedness and strengthen-
ing capacity of laboratory response and, therefore, these benefits
outweighed the risks of not performing such proficiency testing
activities.
During this evaluation we are analyzing the exercise elements
- Shipment
- Response time
- Correct qualitative and quantitative results.
The bacterial EQAEs were focused on B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F.
tularensis, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Burkholderia mallei, Brucella
melitensis-group, and only in Q-2 on Coxiella burnetii. From 7 to
15 samples, according to the exercise scenario, containing living
bacteria (native samples), partially mixed with typical “contami-
nating” bacteria and inactivated bacteria in a variety of complex
matrices and were provided by the RKI. Typical composition
of EQAEs and summarized results are given in Tables S1–S8 in
Supplementary Material.
Shipment was identified as a potentially very sensitive element
in the EQAEs and was therefore prepared with a comprehen-
sive effort involving the provider as sender, shipping agency, and
the consignee considering the international regulations for air
(IATA) and ground (ADR) transportation of dangerous goods of
class 6.2.
According to the European Export Regulations of goods with
dual-use potential (10), the provider has received a general export
license for the set of defined biological agents relevant for this
project from the German Federal Office of Economics and Export
Control (BAFA), which has fully implemented the European Reg-
ulation article 9 (2) (10, 21). This license is required for EU
exports to any non-EU Member States. Anyway each EQAE has
been announced to the BAFA and any additional national regula-
tions of the EU Member States have been followed by the partners
receiving the material.
It was extremely important for Biosafety and Biosecurity rea-
sons to select a reliable shipping agency. In this context, a mar-
ket analysis was conducted and revealed only one appropriate
provider, who could be identified as an appropriate shipper in
terms of shipment quality and bio-risk management. At the begin-
ning of the project, some partners intended to use alternative
shipping approaches for ground transportation to reduce costs.
However, it appeared that the cooperation with less experienced
companies caused doubts concerning an appropriate risk manage-
ment with all involved parties (sender, shipper,and consignee),and
the reduced costs were compensated by an increased work load.
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Most problems appeared through inadequate knowledge of dri-
vers and equipment of vehicles according to the ADR and through
the deficient traceability of sent material. As a commonly agreed
solution it was decided to use only certified and known shippers.
This approach resulted in a high quality of shipment without any
lack of traceability. Some rare delays at custom authorities were
usually due to lack of provided information by the consignees and
technical problems at the customs office and could be solved by
the support of the shipper. During the project, all participants
were learning from these administrative issues and cross-border
problems did not really occur.
This was part of the reason why the deviation of time, required
for the delivery of samples to the various participants, was signif-
icantly reduced. All in all, the transportation time was relatively
short and border issues were an exception and could be solved
without serious problems.
It becomes very obvious that the involved laboratories substan-
tially improved their response time by about 70%. This important
improvement is due to a better preparedness of the laboratories
through training effects during the exercises and an improvement
of diagnostic algorithms and methods. This practically relevant
achievement is a very impressive outcome of the project and
is rather discouraging for a third party who might have the
intention to misuse a time delay in diagnostics of the agents.
On the other hand, this information might be helpful for other
laboratories to adapt their own procedures to this high level
standard.
The submission of correct quantitative and qualitative results
and the assessment of good performance of the laboratories are a
major element of EQAEs. In addition, even more profound analy-
ses have been performed to identify best practices for correct and
to reveal reasons for incorrect results (data not shown), which
were discussed with the participants. This included applied algo-
rithms and methods. Important conclusions could be drawn and
related recommendations for improvement could be given, where
appropriate.
As a conclusion, PCR or immunological approaches were
identified as best practices for sample analyses as a first step
for preliminary identification of target bacteria, which should
be followed by a confirmation by cultivation/isolation of bacte-
ria and subsequent identification of growing germs by PCR or
other applicable methods like MALDI-TOF (22).
From our study it can be concluded that the range of results on
the quantitative reference samples is by far too broad.
All in all, it can be stated that the laboratories performed on a
high level of diagnostic quality. However, if the sample composi-
tion varied and got more complex and challenging, the individual
as well as the overall results fell off in quality. Together with the
revealed problems that occurred in terms of correct identifica-
tion of Brucella species and F. tularensis subspecies, the detection
of “mixed” samples, the quantification of target bacteria, and the
antimicrobial susceptibility testing (data not shown), quite sensi-
tive information has been produced. As a conclusion of the results,
topical working groups were set up in the framework of NIB
profoundly tackling AST, MALDI-TOF, and the development of
quantitative reference materials. As done here there is a need to
provide the scientific and health community with technical data
on these issues to generate scientific and administrative input and
support. Regarding AST, the European Committee on Antimicro-
bial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) is showing interest in our
activities and a close contact could be established with the aim to
approve our results and take those into consideration for the devel-
opment of appropriate European standards. It can be assumed that
this high standard of diagnostics is rather hindering a third party
to misuse this information. On the other hand, the gained expe-
rience can be very helpful for other laboratories to improve their
diagnostic approaches. Thus, without disclosing individual labo-
ratory performances it seems to be of benefit to publish these data
for the scientific community and policy decision makers in this
area.
DEVELOPMENT AND SHARING OF A REPOSITORY OF HIGH
CONTAINMENT PATHOGENS AND MATERIALS DERIVED FROM IT
(REGARDING WP 5)
To perform EQA exercises and to validate existing and new
diagnostic methods the consortium needs access to appropriate
biological materials (i.e., living and inactivated strains, antibod-
ies, reagents, etc.). During the previous EU projects EQADeBa
and ENP4-Lab repositories have been established which could be
extended and characterized as part of the QUANDHIP JA activ-
ities. One key question related to dual-use issues was how the
information of the repository contents would be communicated
and how requests from the different consortium members, col-
laborating partners, and external experts are dealt with. Internal
data bases are available only on the restricted QUANDHIP JA
workspace providing all available characteristics of the samples.
An appropriate “MTA” for guiding the sharing and the use of
strains has been developed and implemented (an example is pro-
vided as supplementary material). As for the EQAEs this MTA has
been agreed between all partners beforehand including their legal
departments. The MTA is intended to be used also for a rapid
exchange of material in outbreak situations and as well for man-
aging any use of the materials for subsequent research activities.
Another use of the MTA is to advise good practices and to record
the sharing of the materials as part of the bio-risk management
aspect. All partners have been asked to provide relevant and char-
acterized bacterial isolates and, both clinical and environmental
samples. A procedure and recommendations for the transport
of infectious material were developed, including the strict advice
for consideration of national and international regulations, and
according to the dangerous goods regulations.
Today, the QUANDHIP JA NIB repository consists of 148
different strains. From most of the bacterial isolates reference
material has been produced as genomic DNA, as heat inactivated
cells for non-spore-forming bacteria, as PAA inactivated cells for
spore-forming bacteria, and as viable cells. This approach will
be completed for all relevant strains. Moreover, further methods
for inactivation, like gamma irradiation (23), and for storage of
the material, like lyophilization, are under development. In the
QUANDHIP JA NIV, the BSL4 laboratory partners have their
own repository of viral agents are collaborating with the DG
RTD funded European Viral Archives (EVA) project to support
the quality, management, and distribution of viral strains and
reagents (24).
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In order to facilitate the safe and secure circulation of biolog-
ical reference materials and procedures within the network, the
following activities are in planning:
(1) to further develop a list of key reference strains of all BSL4
viruses within the participating members’ laboratories which
has been established in a previous project;
(2) to promote the exchange of all reference strains of all BSL4
viruses with accompanying memorandum of understand-
ing on use and dissemination where appropriate. National
and international regulations as well as appropriate agencies
have to be identified and considered for transfer of material
assuring security and traceability;
(3) to exchange SOPs and supporting cells/reagents to facilitate
the growth of all reference strains in each member’s laboratory,
and
(4) to exchange SOPs for the molecular detection and specific
identification of all key reference strains in all members’
laboratories.
In addition, it was also planned to develop and verify quantita-
tive nucleic acid standards for the comparison of different methods
and instruments.
CONTINUED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARD A COMPETENT
AND RESPONSIBLE WORKFORCE (REGARDING WP 6 AND 7)
Partners of the network have offered practical laboratory based
training to other partners covering laboratory diagnostic response
strategies in terms of preparation and analysis of samples within
BSL3 and/or BSL4 facilities focused on best practices. Twelve
training courses have been provided by selected partners at their
institutions. All associated partners have agreed on the course con-
tents and defined learning objectives and intended outcomes. The
evaluation of the training courses, provided so far, has shown the
high benefit for the participants, which has been implemented for
the optimization of laboratory practices for both diagnostic and
bio-risk management.
This exchange of experiences is one major aspect for the
improvement of the performances shown during the EQAEs and
for the setting up of new technical approaches. Another result of
these courses is that partners may tackle questions,e.g.,of Biosafety
and Biosecurity, on more familiar grounds, and find help by per-
sonal contacts in cases of emergent biological situations. From
the perspective of dual-use one could argue that trainees get deep
insight in best practices, capabilities, and capacities as well as secu-
rity approaches on the trainer’s side. However, all the staff were
selected and responsible for laboratory bio-risk management in
the partners’ states. Moreover, we could create a culture of mutual
trust and responsibility.
The training course within the NIV was organized in five ses-
sions, covering various theoretical aspects of BSL4 work (basic
knowledge, biosafety, management issues, competency, and sce-
nario exercises). In addition, practical training was offered on
BSL4 working conditions, handling a BSL3 glove box, sample
storage, differential diagnosis of hemorrhagic fever viruses, and
decontamination.
TOWARD HARMONIZING BIO-RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
(REGARDING WP 7)
For the development of operational Biosafety and Biosecurity
recommendations useful for self-evaluation and to be agreed
among the project consortium, the work was designed to identify,
agree, and disseminate key elements of structure and operation of
primary and secondary containment, building design and infra-
structure, integrated special equipment, disinfection strategies,
biosecurity issues, etc. The previously developed check lists were
compared with guidelines and recommendations derived from
documents produced by EC, WHO, CDC, CEN workshops and
national authorities. Based on the practical requirements of insti-
tutions running or developing high containment laboratories,
BSL3 or BSL4 check lists will be further developed and vali-
dated considering external input. Currently, this is under further
development.
Considerable collaboration and input has been provided by the
European ENP4 laboratory and Biosafety (EBSA, ECDC) commu-
nity to the development of the CWA 16393: 2012 (25) – Laboratory
bio-risk management-Guidelines for the implementation of CWA
15793:2008 Laboratory Bio-risk Management Standard.
The check list is of almost general character and avoids any
detailed description of the bio-risk management. This informa-
tion belongs only to the partner of the project and can therefore
not be misused by third parties if not disclosed.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE – IMPLEMENTING LABORATORY
RESPONSE SUPPORT ACCORDING TO THE QUANDHIP CORE
COMPETENCIES (REGARDING WP 8)
All efforts and outputs of the JA are used to develop proposals to
support the coordination of response to cross-border events with
highly infectious pathogens is addressing the following areas:
- providing laboratory support for risk assessment in case of
cross-border events with highly infectious pathogens;
- transportation of samples;
- development of collaboration models between specialized lab-
oratories as well as microbiological and routine labs in order to
better coordinate the response and to overcome problems due
to different levels of technical equipment and knowledge;
- promoting interactions within the bacterial and viral networks;
- supporting cooperation models with Emergency services, clin-
ical settings and Public Health officials (including the develop-
ment of SOPs for handling of samples from first responders to
BSL3/4 labs);
- developing secure laboratory procedures in case of intentional
release, bridging CBRN investigation and forensic laboratory
operations.
A document, including a set of recommendations for all men-
tioned issues, has been drafted, disseminated to and discussed
with all project participants. In addition, links with other Euro-
pean initiatives in the field of mobile lab, like DEVCO, have been
considered. Moreover, the final version of the document will be
disseminated through the project website and via scientific and
project meetings (inviting, e.g., EpiSouth plus (26), ERINHA,
ENIVD).
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DISCUSSION
It is now widely accepted in the scientific community to perform
an assessment of the “dual-use” character of scientific projects.
QUANDHIP is a JA aimed to perform quality assessments and
improvement of the diagnoses of highly pathogenic bacterial and
viral agents. Consequently, this also includes all measures for an
appropriate bio-risk management considering the potential dual-
use character of certain elements of the project. These elements
consist of sharing sensitive information on diagnostic approaches,
performance of diagnostic laboratories dealing with highly path-
ogenic microbiological agents, repositories of these agents, labo-
ratory bio-risk management and, in addition, exchange of highly
pathogenic biological agents between participating laboratories
was practically performed.
Several research institutions and authorities, like the Robert
Koch Institute, have developed a policy and recommendations for
this assessment (27). The RKI policy on DURC which is the basis
for the assessment of our projects and which is in line with offi-
cially published recommendations includes several criteria for the
evaluation of research and development:
• to achieve transmissibility of microorganisms or to enhance
their infectiousness,
• to increase the virulence of microorganisms or toxins,
• to increase the tenacity of microorganisms or toxins,
• to facilitate the intake of toxins,
• to promote or induce the resistance of microorganisms toward
therapeutic or prophylactic antimicrobial or antiviral sub-
stances,
• to enhance the capacity for spreading or for easy release or
making them “weapons-grade”,
• to weaken the response of the immune system against microor-
ganisms,
• to alter the host tropism of a microorganism or a toxin,
• to increase the susceptibility of host organisms,
• to generate entirely novel pathogens or to recreate pathogens
that had previously disappeared or had been repressed (eradi-
cated/eliminated/controlled/vanished naturally),
• to alter the absorptive characteristics of a biological agent or the
toxicokinetics in a manner that enhances their effect,
• to reveal methods to lower the effectiveness of medical counter-
measures (vaccinations, therapeutic and prophylactic means),
• to hinder or prevent diagnostic procedures
In addition, other policies, like those provided by the U.S.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) and
EU European Export Regulations, include a principal list of agents
and toxins which might be misused with high consequences for
public health in addition to specific aims of research projects (10,
28, 29). The target pathogens focused in QUANDHIP are listed in
these lists of agents to be controlled for export.
Using this set of criteria we assessed the JA QUANDHIP for
elements of DURC and, when relevant, how it was prevented. The
sensitive scientific procedures in general mentioned in both RKI
and NSABB documents lead to the conclusion that no potential
for DURC can be identified although, in contrast, the indica-
tive list of agents published by the U.S. NSABB, the exchange of
these materials between laboratories and the handling of sensitive
information are raising the need to consider potentially DURC.
However, the work of our project is not focused on research of
these organisms but rather on best practices to detect and identify
these microorganisms. Several international guidelines, regula-
tions and recommendations as well as our own responsibility
lead to the inevitable conclusion that this project is sensitive in
terms of Biosafety and Biosecurity and measures had to be under-
taken to prevent misuse of infectious agents and of information
generated and used in the framework of this project. Under this
premise we would like to illustrate some relevant issues in the
project.
Most relevant in this context might be WPs 4 (EQAEs) and 5
(Repositories) where we exchanged highly pathogenic inactivated
and living microorganisms between participating laboratories.
Beforehand, we developed a strategy to minimize the risk of mis-
use or loss of these agents as already described in the previous
sections. The strategy included
- appropriate selection of participating governmental laborato-
ries and written confirmation by national governments and the
European Commission
- official signature of a restrictive legally checked Consortium
Agreement and MTA
- approved comprehensive check list for laboratory Biosafety and
Biosecurity developed basically in the framework of a previous
project (e.g., 180 check points for BSL3 laboratories)
- substitution of fully virulent pathogens by attenuated microor-
ganisms or non-infectious material where possible
- selection of a reliable and certified shipment agency with an
approved biosecurity policy and fulfilling the international
regulation for transportation of dangerous goods
- consideration of national and international border regulations
for import and export of infectious agents based on the Australia
Group recommendations and Common Control Lists (30)
- and not to be underestimated: the emergence of trust and open-
ness between participants by getting to know each other during
regular meetings and training courses.
Taking this preparation into account three EQAEs including
living bacteria for NIB and three EQAEs with inactivated mate-
rial for NIV were carried out during the project. These exercises
were technically most challenging for the participating labora-
tories. Together with a gap analysis of methods and procedures
the EQAEs and training courses led to a substantial improve-
ment of the performance of many laboratories. Collaboration
between laboratories formed the basis for mutual support in
emerging biological cross-border events but also for scientific col-
laboration. The provided material was also used as a means of
assessment for further evaluation and improvement of labora-
tory techniques. Several participating laboratories were using the
results of the EQAEs for accreditation purposes. In this respect,
the QUANDHIP project had an exceptional international dimen-
sion because the organization of such EQAEs at national level
is almost impossible and not cost-effective due to a too low
number of participants. The check lists for Biosafety and Biose-
curity were used by participants for self-evaluation but also in
Frontiers in Public Health | Infectious Diseases November 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 199 | 8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grunow et al. Diagnostics of highly pathogenic bacteria
some cases for evaluation of newly constructed high containment
laboratories.
The gained experiences regarding shipping issues will also serve
sample sharing during an acute outbreak situation. All samples
delivered in the framework of this project were shipped according
to international regulations for the transportation of dangerous
goods (12, 13). In addition, national regulations for import and
export of such material were considered and a certified shipping
agency contracted. Consequently, no serious problems occurred in
terms of transportation of the samples, nor during border transfer
due to a well prepared action.
Most EU Member States do probably not carry out profi-
ciency tests for diagnostics of highly pathogenic infectious agents
at national level although this would be strongly required to
ensure the necessary quality of diagnostics (30–32). It should
be considered that all activities described above are not only
important from the perspective of intentional release of these
highly pathogenic microorganisms as these bacteria also occur
naturally in the environment and require appropriate diagnos-
tic tools on a regular basis (33–38). The European scope of the
project offers the appropriate framework to evaluate, improve
and sustain these diagnostics to have a broader platform to
develop and exchange knowledge, methods and reference mate-
rial on these often “neglected” but potentially very dangerous
diseases.
Not only agents but also information could be misused. On
the one hand, this was mainly prevented within the consortium
by signed agreements, on the other, a dissemination plan was
developed and the exchange of sensitive information was realized
using a specially secured German governmental internet provider.
The internal workspace was continuously administered and mod-
erated by the coordinator. The individual results of the EQAEs
were strongly confidential and visible for the single participant
only. Only a restricted number of persons from the coordina-
tors´ part could see all results and draw anonymized overviews
and trend analyses. There is no other way than by the lab-
oratories themselves to make their individual results available
to the public. Confidentiality is not only important because of
the good laboratory practice but also because of security issues,
i.e., to prevent information on gaps in the analytical capabil-
ity of a certain national laboratory which could be intentionally
misused by third parties. In contrast, overviews on best prac-
tices and possibilities of optimization of diagnostic approaches,
published in scientific journals and reports, and presented on
scientific meetings, could be useful for non-participating lab-
oratories and stakeholders. The more detailed reports of the
project were restricted to CHAFEA for defining the further
usage.
Also the recommendations and description of the activation
procedure of the QUANDHIP network in biological cross-border
events, drawn in WP 8, could be regarded as sensitive informa-
tion. This document also includes a list of national laboratories
appointed to perform diagnostics on highly pathogenic infec-
tious agents. This operational document should be used by EU
and national decision makers and be distributed to other lab-
oratories conducting “first line” diagnoses. The negative side of
the “dual-use” potential could consist of identifying laboratories
with relatively low diagnostic performance by a penetrator. More-
over, the activation and collaboration procedures inside the net-
work could be disturbed in case of emergent situations including
bioterrorism. Yet, the document does not offer this type of infor-
mation and the established procedures are robust enough not
to be disturbed. Moreover, the document defines clear proce-
dures for laboratory response in cross-border events and indicates
possible supportive collaboration between laboratories in differ-
ent Member States. So, the benefit clearly outweighs a probable
misuse.
All in all, the following summary, including recommendations,
may be given on the outcomes of the JA:
• The degree of laboratory preparedness for the detection of highly
pathogenic infectious agents varies at (national and) interna-
tional level which indicates the need and possibilities for mutual
support.
• All participants underlined the usefulness of the EQAEs and
could improve their diagnostic capabilities and/or evaluate their
high standard.
• The training courses offered significant benefits to trainees and
trainers.
• The initiative has collected experiences on biosafety, biosecu-
rity, and transportation issues throughout Europe. During the
exercises, no serious problems occurred in terms of transporta-
tion due to an intensive preparation of shipment with a neatly
selected shipping agency considering all relevant national and
international regulations.
• The questionnaire on Biosafety and Biosecurity is offered to the
EU for further development and implementation as recommen-
dations for safe and secure handling and exchange of pathogenic
material between European Member States and EFTA as well as
other countries.
• International proficiency tests for diagnostics of highly patho-
genic bacteria are recommended as a continuous process as most
EU Member States do not use this instrument at national level.
• A repository of reference material of highly pathogenic infec-
tious agents has been set up and should be maintained on a
long-term basis.
• A stable network of laboratories responsible for the diagnostic of
highly pathogenic bacteria and viruses is required as these agents
also occur with often unknown and underestimated prevalence
and could occasionally be imported to EU Member States.
• Common recommendations for the testing of antimicrobial
susceptibility of highly pathogenic bacteria and innovative diag-
nostic methods should be developed for European countries.
Finally, we came to the conclusion that the benefit for all par-
ticipating laboratories and therefore for the health protection of
the citizens was stronger than the minimized residual risk of our
activities, which gave us the opportunity to carry out the project
from the perspective of DURC assessment. It were taken all mea-
sure to minimize the misuse of exchanged biological material, to
make these measures transparent to the legal agencies and author-
ities and to create a network of trusted and reliable laboratories,
which professionally handle biological material and information
to prevent any misuse of it.
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